Iran expert Nicole Grajewski tells Meduza how Tehran and Moscow are trading ‘authoritarian learning’ tactics to survive mass unrest
Russia is once again watching one of its allies slide into crisis. Over the past several weeks, mass anti-government protests have erupted across Iran, in what many experts describe as the most serious challenge yet to the Islamic Republic. The Iranian authorities have responded by cutting off Internet access and launching a violent crackdown that has left thousands — possibly tens of thousands — of protesters dead. Even so, Moscow’s public reaction has been muted. Russian officials have largely stuck to familiar talking points, blaming the unrest on “external provocation” and suggesting it will soon fade. To better understand what the Kremlin is prepared to do for Tehran and what it stands to lose, Meduza spoke with Nicole Grajewski, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The following interview has been lightly edited and abridged for length and clarity.
— Russia’s Foreign Ministry has claimed the protests in Iran are being “artificially incited” by “subversive external interference” and framed them as a “color revolution.” Why do you think Moscow is taking this line? And are they likely to stick to it?
— This is the line that they take on almost every kind of protest within Iran, so I’m not exactly surprised by it. If anything, what both the Russians and the Iranians have learned from each other is actually appropriating a lot of the “color revolution” discourse. It’s very typical for the Russians to make those allegations. I think the Russians would definitely stick with it. I don’t see them coming out and saying this is an organic movement.
For them, Iran’s regime survival is so crucial and important that it’s not going to fundamentally change that calculus. This aligns with their broader narrative about Western efforts to conjure up pro-Western regimes. I don’t think that it’s at all surprising. It’s actually very consistent with what the Russian narrative has been for a while.
— Russia didn’t provide material aid to Tehran during the Twelve-Day War and didn’t come to the rescue of its allies in Syria or Venezuela. Is there any reason to think Moscow might respond differently this time and intervene in Iran?
— Well, it depends. There were very limited things that the Russians could have done during the Twelve-Day War beyond providing intelligence capabilities, or at least surveillance. They couldn’t deliver air defense systems — it would have taken them too long for Iran to get trained on some of them.
But because these are protests, this is actually an area where Russia could be very helpful. And I’m pretty sure they are being very helpful when it comes to the spoofing of Starlink and some of the electronic warfare measures. A lot of Iran’s repression apparatus actually comes from Russian technology. Iran basically replicated their own version of the RuNet. So in some ways, Russia is being quite helpful. It’s just more behind the scenes, not overt military aid.
Let’s see what the strikes that the U.S. is planning look like. I think the U.S. strikes might challenge the regime, but I don’t think we’ll see the deployment of Russian troops. Maybe PMCs [private military companies], but that would really be the most drastic situation. Because unlike Venezuela and Syria, Iran is a country that has a strong bureaucratic apparatus. It’s not this banana republic like Venezuela was. For Russia, this is still an important country and an important partner. It’s not Syria, which was essentially a hollow state that the Russians and Iranians have held. So if Iran really does need Russia’s support, I think that they would provide it. Because the nightmare situation for Russia would be for Iran to become a pro-democratic, pro-Western country.
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— Russia’s Foreign Ministry called Trump’s threats of new strikes on Iran “categorically unacceptable.” If the U.S. continues to intervene in places that Russia considers allies, could this eventually push Moscow to respond?
— I think the Venezuela situation was clearly exceptional. The U.S. wasn’t really behind [the fall of the Assad regime in] Syria. It could prompt Russia to respond, but I really don’t think that Russia’s viewing it that way. However, it does give Russia rhetorical justification for a lot of its maligned actions, such as what they’re doing in Ukraine. And it also shows the hypocrisy of the U.S. and these double standards that the Russians love to talk about.
— To what degree is Russia’s military still dependent on supplies from Iran? And how could the current risks to the Iranian regime affect those supplies?
— When it comes to drone production, that’s largely indigenous now in terms of Russia. Russia has really upgraded and transformed a lot of the Shahed [drones]. They’re not the same Shaheds that the Iranians originally provided and helped them make. They might still need Iran when it comes to some components and to [evading] sanctions through black markets. But overall, the Russians aren’t as militarily dependent on Iran as they were in 2022 or 2023. The main thing with Iranian–Russian trade is that there’s not a lot of economic interest there. Even the military components Russia can get through parallel imports, either through China or Kazakhstan. So Iran’s not as vital there.
Iran is important for Russia in other areas. They’re important for this broader anti-Western alignment. Presumably, they both feel they are in this together. But there’s not a lot that Iran can do for Russia at the moment. Unless the Iranians were going to provide Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, which I don’t think the Iranians have enough of at this time. And we haven’t seen any evidence of the [missiles] they allegedly provided to Russia.
But Russia and Iran do have common ways of learning in terms of their military operations. Whatever happens between the U.S. and Iran, or if Iran faces another wave of strikes, the Russians get data from the Iranians. They share their experiences operating against U.S. systems or Western systems and components.
— If the Iranian regime were to fall, what would that mean for Russia’s broader foreign policy? In Syria, we saw Moscow quickly try to establish relations with the new leadership — could something similar happen in Iran?
— I think that’s certainly possible. It was surprising how quickly the Russians were able to pivot in Syria. But if you actually look at the Soviet relationship with the Shah and with the former Pahlavi regime, that was quite acrimonious because of Stalin’s invasion [in 1941] but eventually became quite pragmatic because of the land border. They had these trade connections, there was a rail line that connected them, and the Soviets came in and built the Esfahan metal works plant.
So, there are ways that the Russians might be able to serve as a balance to whatever kind of regime arises. And we also don’t know if it’s going to be a pro-Western regime. If this regime falls, it’s really unclear whether the next one is going to be unequivocally pro-Western. It could be the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], which would be great for the Russians, because that’s their favorite part of the Iranian establishment to deal with.
— Is there any other Russia connection you think is being overlooked right now?
— I think it’s erroneous that people are using the setbacks in Venezuela and Syria and the situation in Iran as an indication of Russia’s might. A lot of the time, we look at these conflicts too narrowly, through [the lens of] whether or not this is a loss or a win for Russia. And people on the ground aren’t thinking about the Russians. It’s about the protesters who are trying to fight against this repressive regime.
We don’t know what will happen next, but I do think that the big flaw in a lot of the reporting and analysis has been to say: “Oh, Russia’s close partners are falling, therefore Russia is weak.” I don’t think that’s an indication of Russia’s strength. I think the U.S. would have had a very difficult time if it were an ally propping up Assad in that kind of counteroffensive. We center Russia too much in some events that are actually outside of their capabilities and even the capabilities of more powerful states. I’m not excusing Russia’s actions, I’m just saying that I think we sometimes overplay Russia’s hand in some of these events.
The exception is the repression side of it; the Russians are so involved right now when it comes to shutting down the Iranian Internet. That’s the Russia angle here: how it’s been quite helpful when it comes to Iran’s repression apparatus. I think the more harrowing [aspect] for the Kremlin might be that Iran, this repressive authoritarian country led by a small group of elites, could face this kind of popular protests. The Russians are likely watching this with some concern, and learning how to avoid a mass mobilization of genuine opposition. So this could be something that leads to authoritarian learning in Russia as well.
